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Abstract
In this paper we use Colombian manufacturing data on exports and external financing for
the period 1998 − 2006 to estimate the credit elasticity of exports. We use bank-firm
linked data to construct a supply side instrument for a manufacturer’s demand of credit,
which we use to address the reverse causality between a manufacturer’s export revenue and
its demand for credit. We find that access to credit produces a significant increase on a
manufacturer’s export revenue explained by the positive effect of credit on an exporter’s
market reach - number of destinations -. Across manufacturers the effect of credit on a
manufacturer’s export revenue varies by size. While medium sized manufacturers use credit
to increase their market reach, market penetration and product mix, large manufacturers
only use credit to increase their market reach. Small manufacturers do not seem to benefit
from bank credit.
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1 Introduction
In order to produce, manufacturers need working capital that is used to pay for upfront costs that are due
ex-ante production and sales are realized. When pockets are deep upfront costs are paid with a manufac-
turer’s internal resources, but when the available working capital is limited, an active manufacturer is left
with two options: 1) downsize the scale of production until the upfront costs are fully paid with internal
resources, or 2) use an external financing source (investor) to meet its capital needs. In the latter case,
access to an external financing source not only enables a manufacturer to avoid the under-investment
problem of producing at a lower scale, but it also offers him the possibility to be active even in the cases
when upfront costs are higher than the available internal resources.
Since exporting manufacturers incur additional upfront costs to service foreign market destinations,
access to external sources of financing plays a key role in determining a manufacturer’s export success.
In line with the recent empirical evidence that links the use of external financing to the firm with a firm’s
export performance. We use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the credit elasticity of exports
for manufacturing firms.
We use data for Colombian manufacturers’1 to construct a data set that matches detailed manufac-
turer level information regarding exports, with detailed balance sheet information and matched firm-bank
data. A manufacturer’s balance sheet information enables us to know the magnitude of the external fi-
nancing provided by banking institutions, while the matched firm-bank data is used to identify the bank-
ing institutions that provided the external financing to the manufacturer. These data also allows us to
know the total lending disbursement performed by each financial institution. Together, these data allow
us to estimate the bank financing elasticity of exports while controlling for firm specific and aggregate
specific factors that are also related to a manufacturer’s export performance.
Our findings suggest that bank financing has a significant and positive effect on a manufacturer’s
total volume of exports. We find that manufacturers use bank financing to increase their export market
reach denoted by the number of export destinations. However, bank financing does not seem to have
the same impact on the export outcomes of all manufacturers. Our results suggest that the positive
effect of bank financing on a manufacturer’s exports varies by manufacturing size. Bank financing
seems to have a higher significant effect on medium-sized manufacturers, operating through all export
margins. Medium-sized exporters use bank financing to increase their market reach, market penetration
and product mix.
Empirically, our strategy uses the firm-year variation of the credit provided by banking institutions
to estimate the bank financing elasticity of exports, while controlling for a manufacturer’s prior leverage
ratio, and a set of manufacturer and sector-year fixed effects. The use of manufacturer fixed effects
sweeps out all the manufacturer specific non-observable factors that do not vary over time, but are
related to a manufacturer’s export performance and access to bank financing. The sector-year fixed
effects control for macro and sector specific factors which in turn are known to affect a manufacturer’s
export performance and bank financing.
1Recent evidence on the real effect of bank financing on export entry is also available for other Latin-American
countries. For example, Alvarez and Lopez (2012) use plant level data for Chile, and they find that financial devel-
opment increases the probability of export participation of a plant, while Castagnino, D’Amato, and Sangiacomo
(2013) use firm level from Argentina to show that manufacturers with more access to bank credit are more likely
to start exporting. Nevertheless, none of these studies are able to make a causal interpretation of the result.
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The challenge resides on acknowledging that the estimation of the credit elasticity of exports is
subject to a reverse causality bias. While banking credit may lead a manufacturer to export, export par-
ticipation may lead a manufacturer to accrue debt with banking institutions.2 To address this problem,
all of our estimates instrument a manufacturer’s total demand of banking credit with a supply side instru-
ment that is manufacturer specific. We instrument a manufacturer’s banking credit demand with the total
loan disbursements of the banks that have a lending relationship with a manufacturing firm. Provided
that our matched firm-bank dataset enables us to identify the financial institutions that have a lending
relationship with a manufacturer, we use the banks’ balance sheet information on total loan disburse-
ments jointly with a manufacturer’s information on it’s financial lending ties to construct a supply side
instrument for a manufacturer’s demand of banking credit. Our identification strategy uses the supply
side determinants of a bank’s credit disbursements to isolate a manufacturer’s demand of banking credit
from the factors determining a manufacturer’s export performance. This empirical strategy allows us to
estimate the effect of banking credit on a manufacturer’s export performance.
In line with the recent and growing trade literature studying the real effects of credit constraints on a
manufacturer’s export performance, our baseline result suggests that access to external financing in the
form of banking credit has a positive and significative effect on a manufacturer’s export performance.
Although the recent theoretical and empirical literature by Chaney (2005), Muuˆls (2008), Berman and
He´ricourt (2010) Manova (2013) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014) supports the idea that access to ex-
ternal financing has a real and positive effect on a manufacturer’s export performance,3 the novelty of
our paper resides on using disaggregated financial information at the firm level to determine whether
a manufacturer uses external resources to finance it’s own operational cycle,4 rather than relying on
standard proxies that the literature uses to infer whether manufacturers rely on external financing or if
manufacturers are credit constrained.5
Our findings support the concept that external financing to the firm in the form of banking credit not
only plays a central role in determining a manufacturer’s entry decision into exporting (Chaney (2005),
Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007), Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2009) and Berman
and He´ricourt (2010)), but they also support the concept that manufacturers also use external financing
to finance their operational variable cost. As in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), Muuˆls (2008),
Minetti and Zhu (2011), Manova (2013) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014) our empirical setup relates a
manufacturer’s export revenue with a manufacturer’s size of external financing.6
2Results on the direction of the causality are mixed. For example, Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller (2007)
use a panel dataset of 9292 UK manufacturing firms, over the period 1993−2003, and they find evidence suggest-
ing that participation in export markets improves firms’ financial health. On the contrary Bellone, Musso, Nesta,
and Schiavo (2010) use French data of 25,000 manufacturing enterprises, over the period 1993 − 2005, and they
find that firms staring to export display a significant ex-ante financial advantage compared to their non-exporting
counterparts.
3While Manova (2013) provides cross country sectoral evidence on the effect of credit constraints in financially
developed economies on sectoral export patterns, Muuˆls (2008), Berman and He´ricourt (2010) and Feenstra, Li,
and Yu (2014) use firm level data to provide evidence on the negative effect of credit constraints on a manufac-
turer’s export performance.
4Unfortunately, when a manufacturer does not use external financing, we can’t differentiate if this was a choice
or it was a result of being credit constrained by all the existing banking institutions.
5For example, Manova (2013) uses the standard Rajan and Zingales (1998) sectoral financing need to infer if
a sector relies intensively on external sources of financing. Muuˆls (2008) focuses her analysis using a firm level
credit score, while Berman and He´ricourt (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014) use financial leverage ratios to
infer if a manufacturer is credit constrained.
6While in Chaney (2005), Muuˆls (2008) and Manova (2013) a manufacturer’s level of debt is taken as given,
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Similar to Amiti and Weinstein (2011) and Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011),
we take advantage of our matched firm-bank data and we construct a manufacturer-specific supply side
instrument for credit demand. But, rather than using supply side variations of bank lending in times
economic distress, our empirical estimation uses the variations in the supply side of bank credit to the
firm.7 The notion that supply side shocks matter for loan supply has been already established by previous
literature. Using 1990s’ data of Japanese banks, Peek and Rosengren(1997, 2000 and 2005) documented
that financial health deterioration of Japanese banks led to a short supply of credit to construction firms
in the US, with significant higher negative effects on the construction activity in the states that were
heavily dependent on the financing provided by the affected Japanese banks. Using aggregate data,
Ashcraft (2014) finds that the deterioration of the financial health of banks in Texas led to decrease of
the country level output.
Our findings are also linked to the evidence found in the literature of finance and growth suggesting
that countries with more developed financial systems have a comparative advantage in sectors with
higher dependence on external sources of financing. While Rajan and Zingales (1998), Petersen and
Rajan (1997) and Fisman and Love (2003) find that access to external financing has a positive and
higher significant effect on the sectoral growth rates of financially dependent sectors,8 recent evidence
by Manova (2013) suggests that the sectoral growth rate of exports is higher for financially dependent
sectors when located in financially developed countries. But in times of economic downturns, Braun
and Larrain (2005), Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan
(2008) show that the short supply of credit has a higher real effect on the growth rates of financially
dependent sectors.9 In the period of the 2009 global economic crisis, evidence by Berman (2009),
Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) and Chor and Manova (2012) confirms that most financially dependent
exporters were more negatively affected by the short supply in external financing.
Our paper contributes to the current literature of trade and external sources of financing to the firm by
finding that the positive and significant effect of bank financing on exports varies across manufacturers’
size. In particular, we find that the effect of bank financing on a manufacturer’s market penetration is
significantly higher for small and medium-sized firms, while the effect of bank financing on a manufac-
turer’s export market reach is significantly higher for medium and large-sized firms. The mixed results
suggest that there is a clear distinction on bank financing strategy by firm size. Small and medium-sized
manufacturers use bank financing to increase their product mix, while medium and large-sized manufac-
Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014) develop a contract theory model of financing where manufacturer’s endogenously
choose their level of external financing and their optimal level of interest rates which enables the creditor to
acknowledge a manufacturer’s credit type. In a general equilibrium setup, Formai (2013) develops a model where
firms finance the costs for product innovation and domestic and foreign market entry with external capital. In
this setup credit frictions cause misallocations of resources with significant effect over the export performance of
manufacturing firms.
7In particular Amiti and Weinstein (2011) and Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011) use
the change of a bank’s financial health in periods of economic distress as an instrument for the change of a
manufacturer’s demand for credit.
8While Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that the growth rate of sectors relying more on external financing is
higher when located in financially developed economies, Fisman and Love (2003) and Petersen and Rajan (1997)
show that in non-developed economies sectoral growth rates are higher for sectors that are more intense in the use
of supplier trade debt; an alternative source of external financing to the firm.
9A common problem within this literature is that estimates do not address the endogeneity problem between
crises and growth. Lower growth rates may deter the ability of agents to repay back loans, so crises may arise as
a consequence of low growth rates.
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turers prefer to use bank financing to increase their export market reach. We reconcile this finding with
the prior evidence of Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) and Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksi-
movic (2006) suggesting not only that access to finance is different by firm size, but these differences
translate into growth outcomes that vary by firm size.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 summarizes why external financing to firms is more
important for exporting firms, and also describes the theoretical results embodied by previous models
of international trade and firm credit constraints. Section 3 provides a description of our dataset and
formulates our empirical estimation strategy. Section 4 discusses our results; and finally, section 5
concludes.
2 External Financing and Related Literature
2.1 Relevance of External Financing
Production is a capital intensive activity that requires the payment of upfront costs which are financed
using a manufacturer’s internal and external resources. When internal resources are limited, external
resources become an additional financing source that manufacturers use to accrue the entire upfront costs
of production. In this case, access to external financing becomes an important instrument that enables
a manufacturer to overcome cash flow needs without affecting its decision on the scale of production.
In this sense, domestic and exporting firms are not very different from each other; both require working
capital to cover upfront costs.
In comparison when producing for the local market, exporters accrue additional upfront costs. Some
of these costs are related to fixed costs of exporting, affecting entry into export market destinations, while
others are related to an increase of a manufacturer’s marginal cost. The latter may be explained by the
rise of per unit charges due to additional transport fees when shipping cargo to a foreign destination, or
because per unit costs increase as manufacturers decide to upgrade a product’s characteristics to match
consumer preferences in more demanding foreign markets, or because a manufacturer engages in per
unit marketing costs following a sales strategy to position its product in the foreign market.10 Either
way, an increase in a manufacturer’s variable cost structure affects its optimal pricing rule which in turn
affects its total demand, total export revenue and total export profit.
In addition to paying for additional upfront costs, exporters face additional financing needs due to
the mismatch between the time when costs are accrued and the time when revenue from foreign market
destinations is realized. That is, to deliver a product in T days in a foreign destination, a manufacturer
must first buy the inputs required for production. Unless the timing of payment of these inputs is set to
be equal to the timing when export revenue is realized, manufacturers are required to pay for production
costs prior to the realization of revenue. Since production, transportation, customs’ processing and local
distribution in the final market requires additional time, exporters need to finance operational costs for
at least two additional months beyond the time required by manufacturers producing only for the local
market.11 Exporters are thus more dependent on external sources of financing than domestic producers.
10In Arkolakis (2010) marketing costs gives rise to a new margin of adjustment of a country’s volume of exports.
11According to Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2010), on average it takes 31 days for firms to transport a 20 foot
container from its factory doors into a shipping vessel, and another 25 days for firms in the destination country to
receive the good at the purchaser’s location.
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Understanding how exporters use external financing to the firm allows us to determine how financing
affects a manufacturer’s export market performance. Depending on the financing need, external financ-
ing to the firm may only affect a manufacturer’s decision to enter into foreign export markets (as in
Chaney (2005)), while if debt is also used to finance a manufacturer’s variable cost, one should expect
that the financing cost will also impact export revenues through the implied shift in the variable cost
(see Muuˆls (2008), Manova (2013) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014)). In the following sub-section we
will provide a brief overview of the results obtained when heterogenous productive manufacturing firms
are internally financially constrained; hence, they use external financing to fund their fixed and variable
costs.
2.2 Theoretical Related Framework
Recent literature on international trade accounts for the effects of credit constraints on export market
outcomes. In this section, we use Manova’s (2013) baseline model to highlight the effects of external
financing on a firm’s decision to export and on a firm’s export revenue. We use these findings to guide
our empirical estimation in section 3.
In Manova’s (2013) model, heterogenous productive exporters finance their total cost structure using
internal and external sources of financing to the firm. As in Braun (2003), manufacturers’ acquire exter-
nal financing from financial markets by pledging a tangible asset that is only used when a manufacturer
fails to honor the financial contract. Under a given demand for external financing and an exogenous
probability of repayment, financially dependent exporters choose an optimal pricing rule which among
other factors is determined by the return paid to the external investor. Since the cost of capital shifts a
manufacturer variable cost, financially dependent exporters price their products at a higher per unit level.
Higher per unit prices decrease demand, which translates into lower export revenues that financially de-
pendent producers are willing to accept at the expense of lower financing costs. This trade off enables
financially dependent exporters to export at a scale that, although smaller, is closer in magnitude to the
scale achieved if they where not financially dependent.
As proposed, external financing enables a manufacturer to meet the cash flow requirements that
otherwise would not be able to meet, avoiding to shut-down operations due to liquidity constraints.
In comparison to this outcome and despite the increase in marginal cost, access to external financing
enables the exporter to produce at a higher scale and it enables the exporter to obtain a higher revenue.
In terms of entry, a manufacturer self-selects into local and foreign markets when its productivity
level is above certain endogenous market specific certain cut-off level. In the context of a model with fi-
nancially dependent manufacturers, Manova’s (2013) model provides four endogenous entry thresholds
per destination market. Two determine entry for non-financially and financially dependent local man-
ufacturers, while the other two determine entry for non-financially and financially dependent foreign
manufacturers.
Regardless of the original location of manufacturers, the entry threshold for a financially dependent
manufacturer lies to the right of the entry threshold for non-financially dependent firms. Meaning that
highly financially dependent manufacturers are less likely to self select into production, as the cost and
the magnitude of the external financing makes entry to only be achieved by highly productive man-
ufacturing firms. In this model financially dependent manufacturers experience a productivity cut-off
condition that increases with a manufacturer’s level of financial external dependence. Consequently, a
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highly financially dependent manufacturers are less likely to produce or export, as the endogenous entry
conditions are set at a higher level. In this setup external financial dependence is only offset when a
manufacturer draws a high productivity, or when the financially dependent manufacturer offers the in-
vestor a higher return to secure the external financing.12 Across sectors, entry into exporting becomes
more difficult as sectoral characteristics induce firms to become more dependent upon external sources
of financing.
Credit dependence also affects the number of destination countries a firm chooses to serve and the
number of products that a firm decides to trade. In terms of destinations, financially dependent firms
choose which destinations to service, ranking them from most profitable to least profitable. Conditional
on the external financing obtained by the firm, the number of destination markets it serves is directly
related to how credit dependent the firm is. Highly financially dependent manufacturers are able to
export to fewer destinations. Likewise, manufacturers facing external financing constraints will export
only the most profitable products, and will ship fewer products to their foreign market destinations.
To summarize, credit constraints affect both a firm’s extensive and the intensive margin of trade.
These effects are more pronounced when firms are more dependent on external sources of financing.
Understanding how a firm uses external sources of financing allows us to identify the financing sources
that might be used to lessen the adverse effects of the cost of external financing on a firm’s extensive and
intensive margins of trade.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
To relate a manufacturer’s current export outcomes to its current external financing sources, we con-
structed an unbalanced panel dataset using detailed information on exports, financial statements and
bank-firm linked data for 2, 930 Colombian exporters, classified within the industrial sectors of Agricul-
ture (sectors 1-5) and Manufacturing (sectors 15-39) as defined by the international standard industry
classification, ISIC revision 3.1, for the period 1998− 2006.
Manufacturing export data was extracted from the Transactional Export Dataset (TED) processed
by “Direccio´n de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales” (DIAN). TED contains the universe of transactions
realized by Colombian exporters at the product level per destination country.13 From this dataset we
extracted annual information on the total value of exports, the market reach - number of export destina-
tions -, product mix14 - number of exported products - and the export market penetration - exports per
destination - for the universe of Colombian exporters.
A manufacturer’s financial information was extracted from the Financial Statement Database pro-
cessed by the “Superintendencia de Sociedades” (SS). Although this dataset does not allow us to obtain
12Unfortunately, this type of setup does not take into account that higher returns imply an endogenous ad-
justment of the repayment probabilities. Since repayment probabilities are taken as given, the model does not
capture the decrease in the probability of repayment caused by rise of a manufacturer’s credit dependence, or
when exporters accept higher interest rates in return of securing a loan disbursement.
13Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout(2007,2008) use this data to provide firm level evidence on the patterns of
market reach of Colombian exporters.
14For robustness purposes we performed this calculation defining a product line at the 10, 8 and 6 digit level of
the harmonized system code product classification.
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financial information for the universe of manufacturing firms, it allows us to gather detailed financial
information on the type, the term and the currency composition of the external financing of a sub-set of
manufacturing firms. Colombian regulations established that there are two reasons why a commercial
manufacturer could be included in this data set: First, if at the end of the fiscal year15 its sales/total assets
are higher than a reporting threshold that is set in multiples of the country’s yearly monthly minimum
wage. Since 1993, the reporting threshold requirement has been modified three times. Decree 1258 of
1993 initially established that firms with only a value of assets over the equivalent of 20,000 times the
minimum monthly wage were oblige to report their financial statement to SS.16 Decree 3100 of 1997
modified the baseline financial account upon which the threshold was set. From this point onwards, the
threshold was set to be compared with a manufacturer’s total assets or total sales. Decree 4350 of 2006
increased the minimum monthly wage multiple up to 30,000 times the total level of assets or sales of the
firm. Meaning that in year 2006, a manufacturer was oblige to report its financial statements to SS if at
the end of the fiscal year its level of sales or total assets was above USD5.2 millions.17
Second, for regulation purposes the superintendent in charge might decide to include manufactur-
ers in the survey even though they fail to meet the minimum reporting threshold upon which they are
obliged to report their financial statements to SS. Several non-observed reasons may explain the inclu-
sion of these firms within the data set. For example, a direct petition of the stakeholders, or a judicial
requirement may require the superintendent to oblige a manufacturer to report its financial statements to
SS.18
The two rule selection criteria of inclusion into the SS data set not only implies that our data set
is mainly composed by medium and large sized firms, but it also introduces a bias on a manufacturer’s
entry decision into producing/exporting. That is, the year when a firm reports financial information to the
SS does not correspond to the year when the firm decides to be active. Across time, when a firm fails to
be included within the SS database, it does not imply that the corresponding manufacturer has decided
to exit the market; it only means that a manufacturer’s sales/assets size does not meet the selection
reporting criteria. For our empirical exercise, we cannot use the data to study the self-selection process
into producing/exporting, but we can use the data to investigate the relation between a manufacturer’s
external financing choices and a manufacturer’s export outcomes. In this context, our empirical strategy
requires accounting for the selection bias to include a manufacturer in the database.
A manufacturer’s information on sources of financing was used to construct a bank-firm linked
dataset that we built using Superfinanciera’s financial format 341 and the banks’ balance sheet informa-
tion. We used Superfinanciera’s format 341 to obtain yearly information of the financial institutions that
are effectively providing credit to manufacturing firms. We matched this dataset with a bank’s informa-
tion on the yearly total loan disbursements, and we obtained a manufacturer specific variable that we use
as a supply side instrument for credit demand.19
15Decree 2649 of 1993 sets December 31st as the end of the fiscal year in Colombia.
16From 1993 − 1996, commercial manufacturers where only obliged to report their financial statements to SS
by only comparing their level of total assets to the level set by the given reporting threshold.
17In table 1 we report by year the thresholds that are used to determine if a manufacturer is obliged to report its
financial statements to SS.
18We would like to thank Marcela Eslava for sharing detailed information on the entry selection criteria into the
SS’s database.
19Sub section 3.2 provides detailed explanation on the construction and use of the financing supply side instru-
ment.
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Export Outcomes and External Financing
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our firm-year unbalanced panel data set that we construct using
firm-level export outcome data, firm-level balance sheet information, and bank-firm linked information.
Our dataset includes 11, 191 observations, for a sample of 2, 930 manufacturing exporters classified
within industrial sectors of Agriculture (sectors 1-5) and Manufacturing (sectors 15-39) as defined by
the international standard industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1, for the period 1998 − 2006. The
available information within the SS’s database enable us to construct an unbalanced database containing
38.4% of the universe of Colombian exporters, which in turn represents on average 72.1% of Colombia’s
total export volume (per year results are reported in table 3).20 This percentage corresponds to almost
the country’s total export share achieved by manufacturers classified in the economic sectors that are not
related to the extraction of petroleum, gas and coal; which in the case of Colombia represents on average
28% of the country’s yearly exports.
On average, a Colombian manufacturer exports a total volume of USD312, 000, with a reported
export market penetration of USD82, 500, an average export market reach of six countries and an average
product mix equal to 8 products.21 A manufacturer’s average size is around USD5.7 millions, with an
asset tangibility equivalent to 20% of a manufacturer’s average size and an average leverage ratio equal
to 49% of a manufacturer’s total assets. While a manufacturer’s active financing is on average provided
by three different financing institutions; our evidence suggests that a manufacturer’s access to finance
might be concentrated, as 25% of the sample of manufacturers obtains external financing from only one
financing institution.22
Although a manufacturer can obtain external financing from different sources, (e.g. standard debt
loans, supplier trade debt, equity and other financing sources), the empirical evidence for Colombian
exporters reveals a concentration on the financing source type. Almost 61% of a manufacturer’s total
liability is financed using bank credit and supplier trade debt. Bank financing accounts to 33% of a
manufacturer’s total liabilities, while supplier trade debt accounts up to 28% of a manufacturer’s total
liabilities.23 The term structure of a manufacturer’s external financing supports the idea that manu-
facturers use external financing to finance their cash flow requirements for production, as 52% of a
manufacturer’s total liabilities are short term related. While50% of this short term financing is provided
by domestic financing institutions, 37% is provided by domestic suppliers.
Across manufacturers, the characterization of the sources and term structure of external financing
reveals differences on the type of financing used to meet a manufacturer’s cash flow requirements. As
reported in panel B in table 2, we classified manufacturers by size using Colombia’s asset classification
criteria as given by Law 590 of year 2000.24 Although Colombia’s current manufacturer size classifi-
20Although the database only matches at most 44% of the country’s number of exporters (year 1998), the
match on the total value of exports is high, and it is in line with recent evidence by Freund and Pierola (2012)
where regardless of the country, custom level data around the world reflects a concentration of a country’s level of
exports. As reported by the authors, the top 1% of Colombian exporters concentrate nearly 51% of the countries
total volume of exports.
21Measured at the 6,8 and 10 digit level of the harmonized system code. For details, refer to table 2.
22Corresponding to the number of financing institutions evaluated at the 25th percentile; see table 2.
23The other 49% is composed by liabilities not related to production; two examples are differed debt to workers
and other liabilities.
24Since late 1980’s, the size classification criteria has been modified in three opportunities: 1)Law 78 of 1988.
2) Law 590 of 2000 and 3) Law 905 of 2004.
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cation is determined by law 905 of 2004, the sample period of our database implies that 70% of the
firm-year observations were subject to the size classification given by Law 590 of year 2000. Hence, we
use the total asset thresholds as determined by Law 590 of year 2000 to classify a manufacturer within
one of the following three size categories: 1) Small: when a manufacturer’s level of total assets is lower
than USD 2.5 millions. 2) Medium: when a manufacturer’s level of total assets is between USD 2.5
millions and USD 5.1 millions, and 3) Large: when a manufacturer’s level of total assets is greater than
USD 5.1 millions.25
Not only we find that export performance increases with size (see figure 1(a)), but we also find that
there are also significant differences in the type and the terms upon which manufacturer’s use external
financing. Small manufacturer’s have a higher percentage of tangible assets, they exhibit a higher lever-
age ratio despite having a lower level of bank debt, and having a lower number of financing ties. Though,
the higher leverage ratio of small manufacturers seems to be explained by their higher use of supplier
trade debt. In contrast, large manufacturers tend to rely more on bank financing, as their total debt ratio
is 8 percentage points higher than the observed for small manufacturers. A manufacturer’s different
financing choice may be partially explained by the relative cost of bank debt. As reported in figure 1(c),
credit interest rates are higher for small manufacturing firms than they are for large manufacturing firms.
We now turn to test whether these financing patterns are related to a manufacturer’s export performance.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our objective is to test whether a manufacturer’s current external bank financing bloani,s,t has a positive
and significant effect on a manufacturer’s current export outcomes yi,s,t. Our baseline specification is
ln yi,s,t =β0 + β1 ln bloani,s,t + β2levrati,s,t−1 + Λiγ′ + Γs,tδ′ + εi,s,t, (1)
where sub-indexes i, s, t refer to a manufacturer i, classified within the industrial sector s at time t.
yi,s,t corresponds to a manufacturer’s total value of exports, but provided that its total export revenue
may be decompose into its export margins, we extend our baseline specification by testing whether cur-
rent bank financing also affects a manufacturer’s export margins. Therefore, yi,s,t not only represents a
manufacturer’s total export revenue, but it also represents a manufacturer’s export market reach (num-
ber of export destinations), a manufacturer’s export market penetration (exports per destination) and a
manufacturer’s product mix (number of exported products). These are measured at the 6, 8 and 10 digit
level of the harmonized system code.
Provided that a manufacturer’s current external financing comes from a wide set of investors; i.e.
bank financing, equity finance, supplier trade debt or loans from non-financial institutions or other in-
25Originally, Law 590 of year 2000 determines that the thresholds used to determine a manufacturer’s size
classification are based on a cutoff level given in multiples of the country’s yearly minimun wage (ymw). Large
manufacturers are those whose level of total assets is greater than 30, 000 ymw. Medium manufacturers are those
whose level of total assets is within the bracket of 15, 001 − 30, 000 ymw. Small manufacturers are those whose
level of total assets is within the bracket of 5, 001− 15, 000 ymw and Micro-manufacturers are those whose level
of total assets is below 5, 000 ymw. The calculations included in the text are obtained using the implied ymw in US
dollars of year 2006 as reported in column 4 of table 2. Since the country’s ymw. changes by year, in our estimates
a manufacturer’s size classification varies through time not only because the implied threshold level changes with
each year’s minimum wage level, but also because a manufacturer’s total asset value also varies through time.
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dividual investors. In all of our specifications bloani,s,t corresponds to the current total value of new
loan disbursements given by banking institutions; bloani,s,t =
∑
b∈B bloanb,i,s,t, where b identifies the
bank providing the external financing and B is the set of banks in the database. The reason to only focus
on current bank financing is based on the evidence that Colombian manufacturers use bank financing as
their main external financing source, while the use of other financing sources represents less than 4% of
a manufacturer’s total liabilities.26
All of our estimates control for a manufacturer’s ex-ante leverage ratio levrati,s,t−1 which we use
to control for manufacturer specific credit constraints that limit its own current export performance and
current bank credit access. We also include a set of firm fixed effects Λi and a set of year fixed effects Γt.
The use of manufacturer fixed effects enables us to sweep all the manufacturer specific non-observable
factors that do not vary through time and are related to a manufacturer’s export performance and to a
manufacturer’s access to current bank financing. Year fixed effects control for non-observable macro
factors that are known to affect a manufacturer’s export performance and a manufacturer’s demand for
bank financing. As an alternative one may also would like to control for non-observable macro factors
that are sector-year specific which in turn affect a manufacturer’s export performance and credit demand.
Hence, our results also include estimates that instead of including year fixed effects, include sector-year
fixed effects. In addition, all of our estimates cluster standard errors using a manufacturer’s industry
classification - 4 digit level, ISIC revision 3.1-.
Even though the use of external financing implies an increase of a manufacturer’s marginal cost that
is equal to the cost of financing (credit interest rate), one should also take into account that external
financing may also imply a decrease of marginal cost due to the scale effect of production. When there
are increasing returns to scale, the marginal cost of production decreases with the scale of production.
When externally financed, the scale of production is higher than the level obtained when production is
limited by a manufacturer’s internal financing. If the savings due to the scale effect of production are
higher than the marginal cost increase due to the cost of financing, one should expect that βˆ1 > 0.
3.2.1 Estimation Problems
Empirically, there are several factors affecting the correct estimate of coefficient βˆ1. First, the estimated
magnitude of βˆ1 is subject to a reverse causality bias. While banking credit may lead a manufacturer
to export, current export participation may lead a manufacturer to accrue current debt with banking
institutions. Second, the correct estimation of parameter βˆ1 should take into account that the selection
criteria to include a manufacturer into SS’s data set produces a sampling of manufacturers that is non-
random (see Wooldridge (2002), chapter 17). This implies that when estimating equation (1) one not
only should take into account the reverse causality problem, but one should also take into account that
there is an incidental truncation problem that if significant may make the estimates of parameter βˆ1 to
be inconsistent.
26See debt ratios of equity and other financing sources reported in table 2.
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We address these problems by re-setting the estimation of equation (1) as
ln yi,s,t =β0 + β1 ln bloani,s,t + β2levrati,s,t−1 + Λiγ′ + Γs,tδ′ + εi,s,t, (2a)
ln bloani,s,t =η0 + η1 ln sloani,s,t + η2levrati,s,t−1 + Λiθ′ + Γs,tµ′ + ξi,s,t and (2b)
y1,i,s,t =1{zi,s,tλ′ + Λiα′ + Γs,tρ′ + νi,s,t > 0}. (2c)
Equation (2a) is our equation of interest. Equation (2b) is the linear projection that we use to address
the reverse causality problem of bank lending and equation (2c) is the selection equation that we use
to correct for the non-random sampling of SS’s dataset. The variables ln sloani,s,t and zi,s,t are the
instruments that we use to address the reverse causality problem and the incidental truncation problem.
While Λi and Γs,t are a manufacturer and year/sector-year fixed effects, and εi,s,t, ξi,s,t and νi,s,t are the
corresponding error terms with νi,s,t ∼ N(0, 1).27
As proposed by equation (2b), in all of our specifications we instrument a manufacturer’s current
bank lending with a manufacturer specific supply side instrument of bank credit that we construct using
the bank-firm matched data set. Provided that this data set contains information on the financial insti-
tutions that have a lending relationship with a manufacturer, and given that from a bank’s balance sheet
information we extract a bank’s total loan disbursements sloanb,s,t, we use these data to construct a sup-
ply side instrument of bank credit sloani,s,t that is equal to the sum of the loan disbursements executed
by the banking institutions that have a commercial banking relationship with the manufacturing firm;
i.e. sloani,s,t =
∑
b∈B sloanb,s,t. Since one may think that the credit demand of big manufacturers
may affect a bank’s overall supply of credit, for each manufacturer the supply side instrument is net of
a manufacturer’s own credit demand obtained from these banks. To sum up, our identification strategy
uses a bank’s supply side determinants of credit disbursements to isolate a manufacturer’s demand of
banking credit from the factors determining a manufacturer’s export performance. We expect that the
first stage results of ηˆ1 should be significantly greater than zero.
We use equation (2c) to address the non-random sampling problem that affects the selection of man-
ufacturers into SS’s database. In this context y1,i,s,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of one
when zi,s,tλ′ + Λiα′ + Γs,tρ′ + νi,s,t > 0, where zi,s,t is a manufacturer-year specific exogenous instru-
ment that determines whether in a given year a manufacturer is included in the data set. Provided that the
SS’s superintendent has discretionary power to oblige a manufacturer to report its financial statements
even though it might not meet the exogenous threshold condition to report, and given that within a ten
year period the SS’s superintendent has been changed every two years, we use a superintendent’s term
in office as an instrument for a manufacturer’s inclusion into SS’s data set. Hence, zi,s,t in equation (2c)
is a matrix with four dummy variables. Each variable takes the value of one during the term when a
given superintendent was in office. Since superintendents are in office for more than a year, and given
that their term in office does not correspond to a calendar year, one does not expect that the set of year
fixed effects will absorb the significance of the coefficients linked to the term in office instruments.
While y1,i,s,t and zi,s,t are always observed, ln yi,s,t and ln bloani,s,t are only observed when y1,i,s,t =
1. Our estimation procedure is applied as follows: First, we estimate parameters λˆ′, αˆ and ρˆ in equa-
tion 2c with a probit of y1,i,s,t on zi,s,t using all the observations. Second, after testing for the sig-
27Additional assumptions require that εi,s,t, and νi,s,t are independent of zi,s,t, and that E
(
sloan′ξ
)
= 0.
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nificance of our term in office instruments, we proceed to estimate the inverse mills ratio λˆMi,s,t =
φ
(
zi,s,tλˆ
′+Λiαˆ′+Γs,tρˆ′
)
1−Φ
(
zi,s,tλˆ′+Λiαˆ′+Γs,tρˆ′
) . Third, we proceed to estimate equation (2a) using an standard 2SLS esti-
mation procedure on the observations where y1,i,s,t = 1, while including the inverse mills ratio which is
set to control for the sample selection bias. In other words we proceed to estimate
ln yi,s,t =β0 + β1 ln bloani,s,t + β2levrati,s,t−1 + β3λˆMi,s,t + Λiγ′ + Γs,tδ′ + ςi,s,t, (3)
using an standard IV estimation approach that deals with the reverse causality problem between ln yi,s,t
and ln bloani,s,t. At this stage we need to test if our supply side instrument is significantly different from
zero (ηˆ1 6= 0), and if the estimate of βˆ3 is statistically different from zero. If we fail to reject that βˆ3 6= 0,
we find that the sample selection bias in the SS dataset is not significant, and estimates of equation (1)
can be carried out by implementing an standard 2SLS without requiring to control for the sample bias.
The observed differences in the financing patterns by size lead us to extend our baseline specifi-
cations by testing whether the estimate magnitude of βˆ1 in equation (3) differs across manufacturers’
size. Prior evidence by Carpenter and Petersen (2002),Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006), and Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) supports the view that access to credit is more diffi-
cult for small and medium sized firms. Hence, one should expect that the estimated credit elasticity of
export outcomes should vary by manufacturer size.
4 Results
4.1 Overall Evidence
Tables 5 through 8 report the results for our benchmark specification as proposed in equations 2a −
2c. We estimate the credit elasticity of exports outcomes, where export outcomes are measured by an
exporter 1) total export volume (table 5), 2) market reach (table 6), 3) market penetration (table 7) and
4) product mix (table 8). In all tables column (1) corresponds to the results obtained when we do not
take into account the estimation problems as recently discussed. Columns (2) − (4) report the results
obtained when we follow the self-selection estimation approach with some differences. While columns
(2) and (3) only take into account the reverse causality problem using an standard IV approach with
year and sector-year fixed effects, column (4) reports the results obtained when we also control for the
sample selection bias using the inverse mills ratio that we calculate after estimating equation (2c). In
columns (2) − (4), we include the first stage results on the coefficient of credit supply and we include
the corresponding F-statistic that we use to determine whether our instrument in the first stage is weak.
Since column (4) is the only specification that controls for the entry selection problem, we also include
a joint significance test of the relevance of the estimated coefficients for the instruments of term in office
that we use to estimate the probit specification.
Results in table 5 are in line with the theoretical findings that current access to bank financing
enables a manufacturer to increase its current export revenue. Not only the estimated coefficient for
current bank financing is positive and significant at 5% in all specifications, but our results suggest
that disregarding the reverse causality problem between exports and bank credit produces a downward
bias in the estimated coefficient that is corrected once we use our manufacturer specific supply side
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instrument as reported in column (2). The first stage results on the significance of our instrument not
only suggests that our supply side instrument is relevant, but the reported magnitude of the estimated
F-statistic suggests that our estimation strategy does not suffer from a weak instrument problem as the
estimated value of the F-statistic is in all cases greater than 10 ( Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)). Results
in column (4) show that the sample selection bias of the SS’s data set is not statistically different from
zero as the significance of the inverse mills ratio fails to be different from zero. One may wonder if this
is because the instruments in the selection equation are not significant. Although we do not report the
estimates of the probit estimate, we report the F-statistic associated to the joint test on the significance
of the instruments that we use to characterize the sample selection into the SS’s data. The term in office
instruments in the probit specification are jointly significantly different from zero. Hence, the lack of
significance of the inverse mills ratio in column (4) implies that estimating equation (1) following the
standard IV estimation approach to deal with the reverse causality bias will produce consistent estimates
for βˆ1. Hence, our estimates in column (3) suggest that an increase in a manufacturer’s bank financing
debt level from the sample average to the level obtained at the 75th percentile implies an increase of
manufacturer’s export revenue of 63.1%.28
Our detailed export data, enables us to test whether the effect of bank financing on a manufac-
turer’s export revenue is channeled through an specific export margin. The available export information
extracted from the TED allows us to calculate a manufacturer’s market reach, market penetration and
product mix at three different levels of aggregation of the harmonized system code. Tables 6 and 7 re-
port the results obtained when testing for the effect of current bank financing on a manufacturer’s market
reach and on a manufacturer’s export market penetration. Table 8 reports the results obtained when test-
ing for the effect of bank financing on a manufacturer’s product mix, given three alternative definitions
to of the head count of products.
Results in table 6 support the idea that current bank financing has a significant effect on a manu-
facturer’s decision to export to more foreign destinations. The reported first stage results in columns
(2) − (4), not only validate the significance of our instrument, but also suggests that our estimation
strategy does not suffer from an estimation bias due to the use of a weak instrument. Column (4) con-
firms that the sample selection bias does not affect the overall estimates of bank-credit coefficient. The
estimated coefficient in column (3) suggests that increasing a manufacturer’s bank financing debt level
from the sample average to the level obtained at the 75th percentile increases a manufacturer’s number
of export destinations by 24.6%, the equivalent to 2 additional destinations.29
Unfortunately, our estimates on market penetration (7) and the product mix (8) reveal that bank
28The estimated percentage increase of a manufacturer’s exports is obtained using the percentage increase of
bank financing when moving from the sample average up to the level observed at the 75th percentile joint with the
estimated coefficient of the current New Bank Financing reported in column (3)-table 5. Thus, a manufacturer’s
export revenue increase of 63.1% = βˆ1 ∗ % M bloan75−50. Provided that βˆ1 = .059 and % M bloan75−50 =[
bloan75
bloan50
− 1
]
∗ 100, where bloan75 and bloan50 correspond to the level of bank financing at the 75th and the 50th
percentile reported in log. scale in table 2.
29The estimated percentage increase of a manufacturer’s number of export destination is obtained using the
percentage increase of bank financing when moving from the sample average up to the level observed at the 75th
percentile joint with the estimated coefficient of the current New Bank Financing reported in column (3)-table 6.
Thus, a manufacturer’s export destination increase of 28.9% = βˆ3 ∗ % M bloan75−50. Provided that βˆ1 = .027
and % M bloan75−50 =
[
bloan75
bloan50
− 1
]
∗ 100, where bloan75 and bloan50 correspond to the level of bank financing
at the 75th and the 50th percentiles obtained from reported log. scales in table 2.
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financing does not have any significant effect in affecting these export margins.
4.2 Evidence by Manufacturing Size
Since our data reveals that there are significant differences on the financing sources used by manufac-
turing firms when characterized by size, we extended our benchmark estimates by testing whether the
effect of bank financing on a manufacturer’s export outcomes vary by firm size. Following the same
estimation approach that we lay out in equations (2a) − (2c), we first test whether bank financing has
a different effect on a manufacturer’s export revenue when exporters are characterized by size. Second,
we continue to test whether the effect of bank financing operates throughout a particular export margin,
and if so, we test if there are significant differences of the effect across manufacturer’s size.
Following Law 590 of year 2000, we classified manufacturers in our database within three groups:
1) Small: Manufacturers with a level of total assets lower than USD2.5 millions. 2) Medium: Man-
ufacturers with a level of total assets between USD2.5 millions and USD5.1 millions, and 3) Large:
Manufacturers with a level of total assets that is higher than USD5.1 millions.
Although we know that estimating equation (1) under the standard IV procedure provides consistent
estimates of the bank financing parameter, in tables 9 − 12 we continue to report the results obtained
even when we control for the sample selection bias. In all tables columns (1) − (3) correspond to the
effect of bank financing when we only address the reverse causality problem while columns (4) − (6)
correspond to the results when we include the inverse mills ratio in the estimates. In all tables we confirm
that omitting the sample selection correction parameter (inverse mills ratio) does not produce a bias on
the βˆ1. Hence, we focus our analysis on the results reported in columns (1)− (3).
As reported in table 9, bank financing has a differential effect on the export revenue of medium-size
manufacturers. The estimates in column (2) suggest that increasing bank financing from the sample
average up to the level observed at the 75th percentile produces an export increase of 63%. The dif-
ferential export increase of medium-size manufactures is not only explained by an increase in market
reach, but it is also explained by an increase on market penetration and product mix. Reported results in
column (2) - tables 9 through 12 - show that a increasing bank financing from the sample average up to
the level observed at the 75th percentile produces a market reach increase equivalent to 1.5 destinations;
produces an increase of market penetration equivalent to 37.6%, and produces an increase on its product
mix equivalent to 2 new products.
Our results only find that bank credit has a significant effect on the market reach of large manufac-
turing firms. In the case of small manufacturers, we do not find significant differential benefits of access
to credit.
5 Conclusions
Recent theoretical and empirical research on international trade provides evidence of the importance of
external financing for exporters. As explained by Chaney (2005), Muuˆls (2008), Paravisini, Rappoport,
Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2011), Manova (2013) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014), financing fixed costs
of exporting with external financing sources only affects the entry decision into exporting, while the
pricing, and export revenue are not affected. However, when variable costs are financed with external
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sources of credit, one may find that the external financing has a significant effect on an exporter’s export
revenue, and on an exporter’s export margins.
Inspired by these literature, in this paper we use detailed manufacturer and bank-firm linked data
to construct a database that allows us to test whether current access to bank financing has a significant
effect on the current export revenue of manufacturing firms. We also test whether this external financing
has a significant effect on export margins as measured by market reach, market penetration and product
mix. Finally, we test whether the effect of current bank financing on a manufacturer’s current export
outcomes may vary by manufacturer size.
Our empirical results suggest that access to current bank financing has a positive and significative
effect on a manufacturer’s current export outcomes. Initial results suggest that current bank financing
increases a manufacturer’s current export revenue. We find that this effect is mainly channeled through
the increase of its market reach.
Across manufacturers size, we find evidence supporting the view that the effect of current bank
financing on a manufacturers export outcomes varies by size. Medium-size exporters are the ones who
benefit the most from bank financing as we find that their export revenue increase because the export to
more destination, they export more per destination and they export new products.
While future research depends on the data availability of detailed financing sources, further empir-
ical evidence should take a look at the substitution or complementarity effect among a manufacturer’s
different external sources of financing. The possibility for a manufacturer to use supplier trade debt
instead of debt with financial institutions may be a key factor that smooths out potential negative effects
of a sudden reduction in access to bank finance.
16
References
ALVAREZ, R., AND R. LOPEZ (2012): “Financial Development, Exporting and Firm Heterogeneity in
Chile,” .
AMITI, M., AND D. WEINSTEIN (2011): “Exports and Financial Shocks,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 126(4), 1841–1877.
ARKOLAKIS, C. (2010): “Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in International
Trade Costas Arkolakis,” Journal of Political Economy, 118(6), 1151–1199.
ASHCRAFT, A. (2014): “Are Banks Really Special ? New Evidence from the Failure of Healthy Banks,”
The American Economic Review, 95(5), 1712–1730.
BECK, T., AND A. DEMIRGUC-KUNT (2006): “Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to finance
as a growth constraint,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(11), 2931–2943.
BECK, T., A. DEMIRGU¨C¸-KUNT, L. LAEVEN, AND V. MAKSIMOVIC (2006): “The determinants of
financing obstacles,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 932–952.
BELLONE, F., P. MUSSO, L. NESTA, AND S. SCHIAVO (2009): “Financial Constraints and Firm Export
Behavior,” Working Paper, pp. 1–40.
BELLONE, F., P. MUSSO, L. NESTA, AND S. SCHIAVO (2010): “Financial Constraints and Firm Export
Behaviour,” The World Economy, 33(3), 347–373.
BERMAN, N. (2009): “Financial Crises and International Trade: The Long Way to Recovery,” .
BERMAN, N., AND J. HE´RICOURT (2010): “Financial factors and the margins of trade: Evidence from
cross-country firm-level data,” Journal of Development Economics, 93(2), 206–217.
BRAUN, M. (2003): “Financial Contractibility and Asset Hardness,” .
BRAUN, M., AND B. LARRAIN (2005): “Finance and the Business Cycle : International , Inter-Industry
Evidence,” Journal of Finance, LX(3), 1097–1128.
CARPENTER, R., AND B. PETERSEN (2002): “IS THE GROWTH OF SMALL FIRMS CON-
STRAINED BY INTERNAL FINANCE ?,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), 298–309.
CASTAGNINO, T., L. D’AMATO, AND M. SANGIACOMO (2013): “How do Firms in Argentina get
Financing to Export?,” .
CHANEY, T. (2005): “Liquidity Constrained Exporters,” .
CHOR, D., AND K. MANOVA (2012): “Off the Cliff and Back ? Credit Conditions and International
Trade during the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of International Economics, 87(1), 117–133.
DELL’ARICCIA, G., E. DETRAGIACHE, AND R. RAJAN (2008): “The Real Effect of Banking Crises,”
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(1), 89–112.
17
DJANKOV, S., C. FREUND, AND C. PHAM (2010): “Trading on time,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 92(1), 166–173.
EATON, J., M. ESLAVA, M. KUGLER, AND J. TYBOUT (2007): “Export Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-
Level Evidence.,” .
EATON, J., M. ESLAVA, M. KUGLER, AND J. R. TYBOUT (2008): “Exports Dynamics in Colombia:
Transactions Level Evidence,” .
FEENSTRA, R., Z. LI, AND M. YU (2014): “Exports and Credit Constraints under Incomplete
Information : Theory and Evidence from China,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Forth-
comin(Forthcoming).
FISMAN, R., AND I. LOVE (2003): “Trade Credit , Financial Intermediary Development and Industry
Growth,” The Journal of Finance, LVIII(1), 353–374.
FORMAI, S. (2013): “Heterogeneous firms and credit frictions: a general equilibrium analysis of market
entry decisions,” .
FREUND, C., AND M. PIEROLA (2012): “Export Superstars,” .
GREENAWAY, D., A. GUARIGLIA, AND R. KNELLER (2007): “Financial factors and exporting deci-
sions,” Journal of International Economics, 73, 377 – 395.
GUISO, L., P. SAPIENZA, AND L. ZINGALES (2004): “Does Local Financial Development Matter?,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 929–969.
IACOVONE, L., AND V. ZAVACKA (2009): “Banking Crises and Exports Lessons from the Past,” .
KROSZNER, R., L. LAEVEN, AND D. KLINGEBIEL (2007): “Banking crises, financial dependence, and
growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 84(1), 187–228.
MANOVA, K. (2013): “Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 80(2), 711–744.
MINETTI, R., AND S. ZHU (2011): “Credit constraints and firm export: Microeconomic evidence from
Italy,” Journal of International Economics, 83(2), 109–125.
MUUˆLS, M. (2008): “Exporters and credit constraints . A firm-level approach,” .
PARAVISINI, D., V. RAPPOPORT, P. SCHNABL, AND D. WOLFENZON (2011): “Dissecting the Effect
of Credit Supply on Trade : Evidence from Matched Credit-Export Data,” .
PEEK, J., AND E. ROSENGREN (1997): “The International Transmission of Financial Shocks : The
Case of Japan,” The American Economic Review, 87(4), 495–505.
(2000): “Collateral Damage : Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United
States,” The American Economic Review, 90(1), 30–45.
(2005): “Unnatural Selection : Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan,”
The American Economic Review, 95(4), 1144–1166.
18
PETERSEN, M., AND R. RAJAN (1997): “Trade Credit:Theories and Evidence,” The Review of Financial
Studies, 10(3), 661–691.
RAJAN, R., AND L. ZINGALES (1998): “Financial Dependence and Growth,” American Economic
Review, 88(3), 559–586.
STOCK, J., J. WRIGHT, AND M. YOGO (2002): “A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification
in Generalized Method of Moments,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20(4), 518–529.
WOOLDRIDGE, J. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press,
London, England, 2002 edn.
19
Figures
Figure 1: Financing Terms by Manufacturer Size.
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Source: Own authors’ Calculations. Note: Data on a manufacturer’s export volume was extracted from TED. Data on a manufac-
turer’s number of financing ties, loan interest rates and collateral size by financing need were extracted from SS’s format 341. A
manufacturer’s size classification corresponds to the asset size criteria determined by Law 590 of 2000.
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Table 1: Yearly Minimum Wage in Colombia and
Yearly Entry Threshold Criteria into SS Database.
Year Decretea
Monthly Monthly Reporting Entry
Minimum Wagea Minimum Wageb Threshold SSc
(Col. Pesos) (US. Dollars) (US - Dollars)
1998 3106, December 1997 203,826 142.93 2,858,634.75
1999 2560, December 1998 236,460 134.64 2,692,812.25
2000 2647, December 1999 260,100 124.57 2,491,494.00
2001 2579, December 2000 286,000 124.37 2,487,353.25
2002 2910, December 2001 309,000 123.39 2,467,813.25
2003 3232, December 2002 332,000 115.37 2,307,436.25
2004 3770, December 2003 358,000 136.19 2,723,870.00
2005 4360, December 2004 381,500 164.38 3,287,611.00
2006 4686, December 2005 408,000 172.80 5,183,938.00
a As reported by the Central Bank of Colombia in http://obiee.banrep.gov.co/analytics/saw.dll?
Go&Path=/shared/Consulta%20Series%20Estadisticas%20desde%20Excel/1.%20Salarios/1.1%
20Salario%20minimo%20legal%20en%20Colombia/1.1.1%20Serie%20historica&Options=rdf&NQUser=
salarios&NQPassword=salarios&lang=es. b For calculation purposes we use the yearly average level of the exchange
rate (col-pesos/us-dollar) as reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database (IFS). c Until 2005, the threshold was
set at 20, 000 times of the corresponding yearly monthly minimun wage. Since 2006, the threshold was modified to 30, 000 times of
the corresponding yearly monthly minimun wage. The Reporting threshold is equal to the product of the minimun wage in Colombia
in US dollars and the threshold expansion factor as previously defined.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics All Manufacturers
Variable Obs. Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. Perc. 25 Perc. 75
Tot Value of Exports (ln) 11,191 12.651 2.613 4.605 20.703 10.874 14.550
Export Market Penetration (ln) 11,191 11.320 2.010 3.912 19.150 10.026 12.640
Export Market Reach 11,191 6.070 6.187 1.000 57.000 2.000 9.000
Product Mix (hs 6 digit level) 11,191 8.215 13.710 1.000 208.000 1.000 9.000
Product Mix (hs 8 digit level) 11,191 8.784 14.690 1.000 217.000 2.000 9.000
Product Mix (hs 10 digit level) 11,191 8.902 14.750 1.000 217.000 2.000 10.000
Total Assets (ln) 11,191 15.563 1.555 10.164 22.422 14.474 16.540
Total Bank Financed Debt (ln) 11,191 12.892 4.455 0.000 20.657 12.398 15.356
Asset Tangibility Ratioa 11,190 0.201 0.157 0.000 0.931 0.081 0.283
Leverage Ratioa 11,191 0.494 0.258 0.006 4.499 0.327 0.634
# of Active Financing Relations 11,191 2.786 2.595 0.000 19.000 1.000 4.000
# of Historical Financing Relations 11,191 3.980 3.173 1.000 25.000 2.000 5.000
Ratio Total Debt with Banksb 11,191 0.324 0.235 0.000 0.988 0.113 0.511
Ratio Total Debt with Domestic Banksb 11,191 0.305 0.229 0.000 0.988 0.097 0.486
Ratio Total Debt with Foreign Banksb 11,191 0.019 0.081 0.000 0.940 0.000 0.000
Ratio Total Debt with Suppliersb 11,191 0.281 0.197 0.000 0.997 0.132 0.393
Ratio Total Debt with Domestic Suppliersb 11,191 0.181 0.163 0.000 0.975 0.058 0.259
Ratio Total Debt with Foreign Suppliersb 11,191 0.100 0.165 0.000 0.997 0.000 0.130
Ratio Other Debtb 11,191 0.032 0.086 0.000 0.928 0.000 0.014
Ratio Equity Debtb 11,191 0.003 0.029 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.000
Ratio Short Term Debtb 11,191 0.522 0.244 0.000 1.000 0.334 0.721
Ratio Long Term Debtb 11,191 0.119 0.174 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.194
Ratio Short Term Bank Financingb 11,191 0.225 0.205 0.000 0.945 0.039 0.369
Panel B: Summary Statistics External Financing by Manufacturing Sizec
Variable Obs. Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. Perc. 25 Perc. 75
Asset Tangibility Ratio - Large Sizea 5,982 0.200 0.152 0.000 0.931 0.086 0.274
Asset Tangibility Ratio - Medium Sizea 2,191 0.189 0.148 0.000 0.865 0.070 0.277
Asset Tangibility Ratio - Small Sizea 3,017 0.213 0.171 0.000 0.916 0.077 0.306
Leverage Ratio - Large Sizea 5,982 0.459 0.226 0.006 3.867 0.299 0.596
Leverage Ratio - Medium Sizea 2,191 0.518 0.291 0.033 4.499 0.337 0.660
Leverage Ratio - Small Sizea 3,018 0.547 0.283 0.015 3.878 0.380 0.672
Total Bank Financed Debt (ln) - Large Size 5,982 13.911 4.619 0.000 20.657 13.802 16.285
Total Bank Financed Debt (ln) - Medium Size 2,191 12.325 3.971 0.000 15.940 12.527 14.329
Total Bank Financed Debt (ln) - Small Size 3,018 11.283 3.873 0.000 15.503 11.323 13.341
# of Historical Financing Relations - Large Size 5,982 4.622 3.518 1.000 25.000 2.000 6.000
# of Historical Financing Relations - Medium Size 2,191 3.759 2.885 1.000 17.000 2.000 5.000
# of Historical Financing Relations - Small Size 3,018 2.868 2.165 1.000 15.000 1.000 4.000
Ratio Total Debt with Suppliers - Large Sizeb 5,982 0.270 0.195 0.000 0.984 0.120 0.377
Ratio Total Debt with Suppliers - Medium Sizeb 2,191 0.291 0.190 0.000 0.965 0.148 0.398
Ratio Total Debt with Suppliers - Small Sizeb 3,018 0.297 0.203 0.000 0.997 0.144 0.420
Ratio Total Debt with Banks - Large Sizeb 5,982 0.356 0.246 0.000 0.971 0.129 0.558
Ratio Total Debt with Banks - Medium Sizeb 2,191 0.303 0.221 0.000 0.988 0.105 0.480
Ratio Total Debt with Banks - Small Sizeb 3,018 0.276 0.210 0.000 0.929 0.094 0.425
Sample: 1998 − 2006. a Measured as a ratio to Total Assets. b Measured as a ratio to Total Liabilities. c A manufacturer’s size is
determined by the entry thresholds given by Law 590 of 2000. Small manufacturers are those who have a total level of assets lower
than 15, 000 times Colombia’s yearly minimum wage (ymw). Medium sized manufacturers are those who have a total level of assets
between 15, 001 and 30, 000 times Colombia’s ymw. Large sized manufacturers are those who have a total level of assets higher than
30, 001 times Colombia’s ymw. See table 2 for a by year reference of the implied ymw in US dollars.
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Table 3: Per Year Export Sample Representation
Year
% Number of % Value of
Exporters Total Exports
in Sample in Sample
1998 37.16 63.92
1999 43.96 64.15
2000 41.61 66.81
2001 39.50 73.13
2002 39.37 73.30
2003 38.29 74.48
2004 35.11 75.06
2005 35.58 79.70
2006 34.63 79.09
Sample Avg. 38.36 72.18
Sample: 1998 − 2006. Note: Own authors’ calculations made with the match of exporters and the yearly universe of exporting
manufacturers reported in TED.
Table 4: Superintendent’s Time in Office at “Superintendencia de Sociedades”, 1998− 2006.
Term in Office Super-Intendent Name
1997 - 1998 Cesar Ucros Barros
1998 - 2003 Jorge Gabino Pinzon Sanchez
2003 - 2006 Rodolfo Danies Lacouture
2006 - 2007 Francisco Nogera Rocha
Sample: 1998 − 2006. Source: “Superintendencia de Sociedades”. For additional information on the terms in office of each
Superintendent refer to: http://www.supersociedades.gov.co/superintendencia/Historia/Documents/
revista-supersociedades-73anios.pdf.
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Table 5: Credit Elasticity of Total Value of Exports
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Value of Exports in t (ln) No IV IV IV IV
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .008 .051 .059 .049
(.003)∗∗ (.023)∗∗ (.026)∗∗ (.023)∗∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.241 -.286 -.319 -.278
(.199) (.202) (.227) (.198)
Inverse Mills Ratio .583
(.611)
Observations 11,191 11,191 11,191 11,191
R2 .887 .882 .91 .883
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Sector-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Sample: 1998− 2006. Number of exporters: 2, 930. We only include manufacturers within economic sectors of Agriculture (1− 5)
and Manufacturing (15 − 39) as defined by the international standard industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1 at the 4 digit level.
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: New Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to the logarithm of the new bank financing
obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4) instrument a manufacturer’s demand for bank credit with the total bank supply of banking
credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit supply. Column (4) includes a control for the sample selection bias of SS’s database.
Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are obtained from the terms in office reported in table 4. All specifications cluster
standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗ means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 6: Credit Elasticity of Market Reach
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Market Reach in t (ln)a No IV IV IV IV
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .002 .024 .027 .023
(.001) (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.066 -.090 -.102 -.085
(.081) (.082) (.095) (.082)
Inverse Mills Ratio .369
(.294)
Observations. 11,191 11,191 11,191 11,191
R2 .871 .862 .89 .863
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Sector-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
a Market Reach is the measured as the ln of the head count of export market destinations. Sample: 1998 − 2006. Number of
exporters: 2, 930. We only include manufacturers within economic sectors of Agriculture (1 − 5) and Manufacturing (15 − 39) as
defined by the international standard industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1 at the 4 digit level. Source: Authors own calculations.
Notes: New Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to the logarithm of the new bank financing obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4)
instrument a manufacturer’s demand for bank credit with the total bank supply of banking credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit
supply. Column (4) includes a control for the sample selection bias of SS’s database. Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are
obtained from the terms in office reported in table 4. All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and
∗ means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 7: Credit Elasticity of Market Penetration
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Penetration in t (ln)a No IV IV IV IV
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .006 .027 .032 .026
(.003)∗∗ (.020) (.024) (.020)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.174 -.196 -.217 -.193
(.164) (.166) (.186) (.164)
Inverse Mills Ratio .214
(.509)
Observations 11191 11191 11191 11191
R2 .85 .848 .884 .848
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Sector-Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
a Market Penetration is measured as the ln of a manufacturer’s exports per destination. Sample: 1998− 2006. Number of exporters:
2, 930. We only include manufacturers within economic sectors of Agriculture (1−5) and Manufacturing (15−39) as defined by the
international standard industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1 at the 4 digit level. Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: New
Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to the logarithm of the new bank financing obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4) instrument a
manufacturer’s demand for bank credit with the total bank supply of banking credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit supply. Column
(4) includes a control for the sample selection bias of SS’s database. Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are obtained from
the terms in office reported in table 4. All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗ means
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 8: Credit Elasticity of Product Mix
Panel A: Product Mix at 6 digits HS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)Product Mix in t (ln)a
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .004 .018 .016 .018
(.002)∗∗ (.010)∗ (.010) (.010)∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.090 -.105 -.107 -.104
(.081) (.085) (.092) (.085)
Inverse Mills Ratio .080
(.284)
Observations 11,191 11,191 11,191 11,191
R2 .838 .835 .874 .835
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Panel B: Product Mix at 8 digits HS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)Product Mix in t (ln)a
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .005 .019 .016 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.010)∗ (.010) (.010)∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.066 -.082 -.089 -.081
(.088) (.092) (.098) (.091)
Inverse Mills Ratio .052
(.284)
Observations 11,191 11,191 11,191 11,191
R2 .83 .827 .868 .827
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Panel C: Product Mix at 10 digits HS
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)Product Mix in t (ln)a
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln) .005 .020 .015 .020
(.002)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.010) (.010)∗∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.059 -.075 -.083 -.074
(.091) (.095) (.100) (.094)
Inverse Mills Ratio .126
(.280)
Observations 11,191 11,191 11,191 11,191
R2 .828 .825 .867 .825
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .743 .682 .743
First Stage: F-statistic 46.294 30.415 47.136
Test Instruments Selection Equation 800.798
P-value 0.000
Manufacturer Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes No Yes
Sector-Year Fixed Effect No No Yes No
a Product Mix is measured as the ln of the head count of products exported, given the corresponding hs category. Sample: 1998 −
2006. Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗
means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 9: Credit Elasticity of Total Value of Exports by Sizea
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizea Manufacturer Sizea
Total Value of Exports in t (ln) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallb Mediumc Larged Smallb Mediumc Larged
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)e .080 .100 .024 .084 .098 .024
(.042)∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.033) (.043)∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.033)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.727 -.467 .122 -.768 -.420 .128
(.439)∗ (.324) (.251) (.428)∗ (.320) (.255)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.709 3.781 1.798
(.747) (3.620) (4.223)
Observations. 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .872 .836 .868 .87 .837 .868
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a A manufacturer’s size is determined by the entry thresholds given by Law 590 of 2000 described in detailed in table 2. Number of
exporters: 2, 930 distributed as follows: 5, 982 Large, 2, 191 Medium and 3, 018 Small. The database only includes manufacturers
classified within economic sectors of Agriculture (1 − 5) and Manufacturing (15 − 39) as defined by the international standard
industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1. Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: New Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to
the logarithm of the new bank financing obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4) instrument a manufacturer’s demand for bank credit
with the total bank supply of banking credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit supply. Column (4) includes a control for the sample
selection bias of SS’s database. Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are obtained from the terms in office reported in table 4.
All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
34
Table 10: Credit Elasticity of Market Reach by Size
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizeb Manufacturer Sizeb
Market Reach in t (ln)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallc Mediumd Largee Smallc Mediumd Largee
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)f .001 .041 .030 .002 .040 .030
(.017) (.016)∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.018) (.016)∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.181 -.080 -.058 -.192 -.058 -.052
(.148) (.175) (.117) (.151) (.177) (.121)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.194 1.776 1.736
(.268) (1.658) (1.488)
Observations 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .848 .811 .853 .848 .812 .853
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a A manufacturer’s size is determined by the entry thresholds given by Law 590 of 2000 described in detailed in table 2. Number of
exporters: 2, 930 distributed as follows: 5, 982 Large, 2, 191 Medium and 3, 018 Small. The database only includes manufacturers
classified within economic sectors of Agriculture (1 − 5) and Manufacturing (15 − 39) as defined by the international standard
industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1. Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: New Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to
the logarithm of the new bank financing obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4) instrument a manufacturer’s demand for bank credit
with the total bank supply of banking credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit supply. Column (4) includes a control for the sample
selection bias of SS’s database. Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are obtained from the terms in office reported in table 4.
All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 11: Credit Elasticity of Market Penetration by Size
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizeb Manufacturer Sizeb
Market Penetration in t (ln)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallc Mediumd Largee Smallc Mediumd Largee
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)f .079 .059 -.006 .082 .058 -.006
(.035)∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.026) (.037)∗∗ (.026)∗∗ (.026)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.547 -.387 .180 -.576 -.362 .180
(.335) (.200)∗ (.191) (.321)∗ (.201)∗ (.192)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.515 2.005 .062
(.577) (3.194) (3.582)
Observations 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .846 .798 .825 .844 .799 .825
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
• a A manufacturer’s size is determined by the entry thresholds given by Law 590 of 2000 described in detailed in table 2. Number of
exporters: 2, 930 distributed as follows: 5, 982 Large, 2, 191 Medium and 3, 018 Small. The database only includes manufacturers
classified within economic sectors of Agriculture (1 − 5) and Manufacturing (15 − 39) as defined by the international standard
industry classification, ISIC revision 3.1. Source: Authors’ own calculations. Notes: New Bank Financing in t (ln) corresponds to
the logarithm of the new bank financing obtained in t. Columns (2), (3) and (4) instrument a manufacturer’s demand for bank credit
with the total bank supply of banking credit net of a manufacturer’s own credit supply. Column (4) includes a control for the sample
selection bias of SS’s database. Instruments for entry into the SS’s database are obtained from the terms in office reported in table 4.
All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 12: Credit Elasticity of Product Mix by Size
Panel A. Product Mix - 6 digits HS
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizeb Manufacturer Sizeb
Product Mix in t (ln)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallc Mediumd Largee Smallc Mediumd Largee
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)f .035 .036 .011 .037 .036 .011
(.023) (.014)∗∗ (.014) (.024) (.015)∗∗ (.014)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.141 -.138 -.020 -.157 -.137 -.014
(.124) (.104) (.175) (.127) (.106) (.179)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.289 .109 1.522
(.339) (2.171) (1.992)
Observations 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .842 .778 .821 .84 .778 .821
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Panel B. Product Mix - 8 digits HS
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizeb Manufacturer Sizeb
Product Mix in t (ln)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallc Mediumd Largee Smallc Mediumd Largee
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)c .038 .037 .011 .039 .037 .011
(.022)∗ (.015)∗∗ (.014) (.024)∗ (.015)∗∗ (.014)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.118 -.085 -.012 -.132 -.080 -.007
(.129) (.127) (.177) (.130) (.126) (.180)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.250 .398 1.464
(.345) (2.182) (2.059)
Observations 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .831 .759 .817 .829 .759 .817
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Panel C. Product Mix - 10 digits HS
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Sizeb Manufacturer Sizeb
Product Mix in t (ln)a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Smallc Mediumd Largee Smallc Mediumd Largee
Total Bank Financed Debt in t (ln)c .039 .037 .012 .040 .037 .012
(.023)∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015) (.024)∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)
Leverage Ratio in t-1 -.082 -.074 -.021 -.089 -.067 -.016
(.151) (.134) (.175) (.153) (.134) (.178)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.119 .534 1.331
(.340) (2.216) (2.026)
Observations 3,018 2,191 5,982 3,018 2,191 5,982
R2 .828 .757 .816 .828 .757 .816
First Stage: Credit Supply in t .693 .885 .665 .677 .884 .665
First Stage: F-statistic 14.285 23.276 25.421 13.452 23.024 25.235
Test Instruments Selection Equation 1195.897 38.01 13.334
P-value 0.000 0.000 .01
Manufacturer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
• a Product Mix is measured as the ln of the head count of products exported, given the corresponding hs category. Sample: 1998 −
2006. Source: Authors own calculations. Notes: All specifications cluster standard errors by industry classification. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗ and ∗
means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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